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1. Overview
China overtook the US as the world’s top emitter in 2007, and 
produced 1.5 times the emissions of the US by 2013 [1]. At pres-
ent, China’s emissions make up over a quarter of the global total. 
China is expected to produce three times the emissions of the 
US by 2030 [2]. Indeed, China’s role and efforts in CO2 reductions 
matter greatly for the peaking of global emissions, even without 
further emission leakages to less-developed regions or countries. 
China recently announced the launch of a nation-wide emission- 
trading scheme (ETS) starting in 2017 [3] in order to help deliver 
its emission peak by 2030. A number of climate policies in Chi-
na are ongoing, and require a full performance review, effective 
coordination, and appropriate implementation of planning and 
monitoring measures along with any newly added mechanisms. 
This paper utilizes the latest energy and emission data to explore 
the impact of emission trading as a policy driver toward absolute 
emission and emission intensity changes in China and in its seven 
provinces or municipalities.
2. China’s efforts toward carbon emission control
China has initiated an ambitious plan to fight climate change, 
having already undertaken emission controls under the central 
commanding administration. A number of policies have been estab-
lished over the past two decades. In the National Scheme on Climate 
Change published in June 2007 [4], the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) promised to make efforts to control 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and produce a 20% reduction in per 
GDP energy consumption by 2010. The NDRC also issued mandatory 
environmental targets to be implemented through the national Five-
Year Plan. In the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010), China issued tar-
gets for a 20% reduction in energy consumption per unit of GDP (re-
ferred to as the Emission Intensity (EI) policy) [5,6]. In the 12th Five-
Year Plan (2011–2015), China introduced a market-based domestic 
ETS; the mechanism underlying this trading system has now been 
established in seven pilot markets (referred to as the ETS policy) [7–
9]. In 2014, the Chinese government issued more policies to control 
climate change and committed to more responsibility. In September 
2014, the NDRC published the National Scheme on Climate Change 
(2014–2020) and stated its intention to reduce CO2 emissions per 
GDP by 40%–45% by 2020 compared with that in the year 2005 [10]. 
China announced that it will peak its CO2 emissions by 2030 under 
the US-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change [11], released 
during the Beijing Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meet-
ing in November 2014. However, there is still no quantitative limit 
associated with this pledge. In December, the Lima Call for Climate 
Action advocated that China, as the world’s largest emitter, pledge 
CO2 reductions alongside other wealthy countries. Recently, China 
announced the launch of a nation-wide ETS that will start in 2017, 
based on the current pilot scheme that is running in seven provinces 
or municipalities.
3. Policy-effectiveness evaluation of the ETS pilot provinces or 
municipalities
The introduced emission control mechanisms are successful in 
terms of improving emission intensities across Chinese regions; 
however, they have a limited effect on slowing down emission 
growth for the nation as a whole and for most of its provinces or 
municipalities. Figs. 1 and 2 show changes in annual CO2 inten-
sity (indicated in the diagram as “CI” and given in tonnes of CO2 
emitted per ¥10 000 CNY of the GDP) and annual CO2 emissions 
(in million tonnes (Mt)) in China, in its six pilot ETS provinces 
or municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangdong, Hubei, 
Chongqing), and in Liaoning Province (an active carbon-exchange 
market) from 1997 to 2012, respectively. In Figs. 1 and 2, “EI” 
refers to 20% energy intensity improvement between 2005 and 
2010 (rectified in 2007); “pilot ETS” refers to China’s pilot ETS in 
seven provinces from 2011 to 2015. 
Fig. 1(a) illustrates the performance of current key emission 
control measures that have been implemented within China. China’s 
CO2 intensity has experienced a rapid decrease from 3.09 t per 
¥10 000 CNY (constant price at the 2007 level) in 1997 to a low 
point of 2.29 t per ¥10 000 CNY in 2002. After China joined the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), China’s CO2 intensity climbed to 
a peak in 2005; this peak was largely driven by the production of 
emission-intensive export products and capital formation [12,13]. 
After this point, efficiency gains were accelerated. China’s EI policy 
helped it to achieve a 28.5% reduction in CO2 intensity in 2013 com-
pared with 2005, which was equivalent to a reduction of more than 
2500 Mt CO2 emissions (i.e., 10% of the global total in 2010). China’s 
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manufacturing provinces or municipalities, as shown in Fig. 1(d)–(h), 
experienced changes that were similar to the change in the national 
average. China’s pilot ETS was a trigger for a further decline in inten-
sity for all the seven provinces or municipalities starting in 2010.
Energy and emission control measures do not have a strong im-
pact on extra efficiency gain in wealthy regions such as Beijing and 
Shanghai, where intensities improved at the rates of 8.6%  and 7.0% 
annually from 1997 to 2012, respectively [14]. Beijing and Shanghai 
are the most developed municipalities in China. The tertiary indus-
try is their pillar industry, counting for 76.9% and 62.2% of the GDP 
in 2013, respectively. These values are significantly higher than the 
national level of 46.1% [15]. Due to their mature and stabilized eco-
nomic structure, these two cities did not have an obvious increase in 
CO2 intensity after China joined the WTO in 2002. Rather, their CO2 
intensities continued to decline at a steady speed due to technology 
improvements and production or municipalities structure shifts.
Economic policies are the key drivers in China’s emissions growth. 
From 1997 to 2002, Chinese emissions grew from 2876 Mt to 3587 Mt, 
with an annual growth of 3% (Fig. 2(a)). Since China entered the 
WTO, this annual growth has accelerated to 11%, with China’s total 
emissions reaching 9465 Mt in 2012. Similar trends can be seen in 
almost all the manufacturing provinces or municipalities. For exam-
ple, two manufacturing regions, Tianjin and Hubei, increased their 
emissions by 3.8% and 2.6% annually prior to WTO, respectively. 
Between 2002 and 2012, this annual growth accelerated to 8.2%  and 
10%, respectively.
The EI policy has no significant influence on slowing the rise of 
CO2 emissions, at a national, municipal or provincial level [16]. Rises 
in emissions did temporarily slow down in 2005 due to the EI poli-
cy. Soon afterwards, however, the emissions growth rate rebounded 
(in 2007). However, CO2 growth has decelerated in all pilot ETS 
implementing provinces or municipalities since 2010. For example, 
Tianjin achieved net emission reductions in 2012 when compared 
with the previous year, although these were less than 3%. Other 
manufacturing provinces or municipalities such as Guangdong and 
Hubei slowed their emission growth to 2%–3% during 2010–2012. 
Although Liaoning is not an official emission-trading region, its 
emission growth decelerated to 2.5% during 2010–2012, compared 
with its rate of 5.9% during 1997–2010. Such emission growth de-
celerations or reductions are mainly driven by economic growth 
slowdown. The pilot ETS plays a minor role in emission mitigation 
because the total emission-trading quotas are small, usually less 
than 1% of the total emissions in any implementing province or 
municipality.
The most developed municipalities, Beijing and Shanghai, have 
already achieved emission reductions since 2007. Their emissions 
decreased by 6.5% and 8.5% in 2012 as compared with 2007 levels, 
respectively. These reductions mainly result from China’s anti-air 
pollution efforts, rather than from the pilot ETS. Beijing reduced its 
coal consumption by half during 2007–2012, and will achieve zero 
coal consumption by 2017, as a means of achieving the goal of an 
annual PM2.5 concentration ≤ 60 µg·m
-3.
4. Outlook for the nation-wide ETS 
China needs a new design for its nation-wide ETS. The pilot 
cap-and-trade scheme that is currently being completed in seven 
Chinese provinces or municipalities has two major issues. Firstly, it 
Fig. 1. CO2 intensity changes. (a) China; (b) Beijing; (c) Shanghai; (d) Tianjin; (e) Guangdong; (f) Hubei; (g) Chongqing; (h) Liaoning. Blue text gives the rates of the changes 
in indicated periods (represented using dashed lines). Red text describes relevant energy or economic policy implementations. 
Fig. 2. CO2 emission changes. (a) China; (b) Beijing; (c) Shanghai; (d) Tianjin; (e) Guangdong; (f) Hubei; (g) Chongqing; (h) Liaoning. Blue text gives the rates of the changes 
in indicated periods (represented using dashed lines). Red text describes relevant energy or economic policy implementations. 
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provinces or municipalities based on apparent territory scope, as 
developed from administrative territory scope. This approach has 
been improved and utilized in several previous studies [1,17–21].
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), administrative territory emissions occur within administered 
territories and offshore areas over which the region has jurisdic-
tion [22]. This includes emissions produced by different economic 
sectors and residences within the region’s boundary [23,24]. In the 
IPCC’s administrative territory scope method, CO2 emissions from 
secondary fossil fuel combustion are counted toward the corre-
sponding secondary fossil fuels. Secondary fossil fuels are produced 
from primary fossil fuels through a transformation process. There-
fore, to avoid double counting, the input usage of the primary fossil 
fuel should be excluded when calculating the primary fossil fuel 
CO2 emissions [25]. Taking cleaned and washed coal as an example, 
the transformation process of coal washing consumes raw coal and 
produces cleaned and washed coal. Based on the IPCC adminis-
trative territory scope method, the CO2 emitted from the raw coal 
consumed in the coal washing process should be excluded from the 
raw coal emissions. When the produced cleaned and washed coal 
is burned, the CO2 emitted will be counted toward the emissions of 
the cleaned and washed coal. Based on the apparent territory scope 
approach, however, we do not include the secondary fossil fuels. 
Here, all of the CO2 emissions induced during the use of the cleaned 
and washed coal are counted as input emissions of raw coal (Table 1).
In this study, we estimate fossil fuel-related CO2 emissions by 
energy types and the total CO2 emissions based on the IPCC national 
GHG inventory guidelines [22]. See Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) below:
                                       i i iCE AD EF= ×  (1) 
                                         iiCE CE=∑  (2)
where, CEi represents CO2 emissions from 18 different fossil fuel 
types; ADi represents the fossil fuels combusted within the pro-
vincial or municipal boundary measured in physical units; and 
EFi represents the emission factors for the relevant fossil fuels. 
These emission factors were collected from our previous re-
search on China’s fossil fuel quality [1]. By adding together the 
emissions from different energy types, we obtain the total CO2 
emissions for one province or municipality (Eq. (2)). We then scale 
down the emissions of each province or municipality by the na-
tional total emissions in order to fill the gap between aggregated 
emissions from the national, municipal or provincial emissions. 
Detailed emission inventory accounting approaches are developed 
in our previous research [18,25]. The constructed CO2 emission 
inventories for China and its seven provinces or municipalities 
are consistent in terms of format and statistical approaches. All 
inventories have emission accounts for 18 types of fossil fuel by 47 
socioeconomic sectors.
still follows a similar emission quota distribution mechanism as the 
European Union (EU) ETS, which mainly relies on free allocation. 
The government uses very strong interventions to control quota 
availability and flows, whereas the market plays a minor role. Sec-
ondly, the current pilot scheme does not allow for cross-provincial 
or cross-municipal emission cap trading. In fact, each participating 
province or municipality sets its own cap and decides which sec-
tors/factories it will cover. For example, transport is included only in 
Shanghai’s ETS. Each province or municipality also determines how 
compliance will be measured. For example, Hubei Province targets 
enterprises that consume more than 60 000 t coal-equivalent per 
year, a threshold that is six times greater than that of Guangdong [2].
New and full-scale national emission trading should fully adopt 
the “auctioning” quota allocation mechanism. Although the auction 
price can be as low as “free” and a price-capping system can be set, 
this mechanism creates a competitive market for users who need the 
emission quota, and provides funds for implementing low-carbon 
alternatives. The government should provide a supporting, regulat-
ing, and monitoring service for the carbon market in China. Mea-
sureable and transparent emission data will form the baseline for 
emission targets. In addition, such a scheme should cover all emis-
sion sectors, rather than the several major industries that are ad-
dressed in the current pilot ETS. On the other hand, a full national- 
scale cap and trade should give sufficient consideration to regional 
inequalities. Economically advanced regions (e.g., Beijing, Shanghai, 
and perhaps other coastal provinces or municipalities) can have 
an absolute emission reduction cap, while interior manufacturing 
provinces or municipalities may be entitled to strict annual emis-
sion growth caps that allow economic transition, and regions in the 
west that are lagging behind may be granted a more generous emis-
sion cap that is, however, accompanied by very clear and verifiable 
efficiency-gain targets. In other words, the Chinese cap-and-trade 
scheme should be parallel to the efficiency improvement target that 
is currently being implemented. China’s anti-air pollution efforts 
create co-benefits for CO2 emission controls. China’s State Council 
has authorized a ¥1.75 trillion CNY ($277 billion USD) investment 
package to implement the newly designed Air Pollution Preven-
tion and Control Action Plan over the five-year period 2012–2017. 
However, air pollution control and climate change mitigation are 
coordinated by different departments in the State Council and are 
implemented by their regional representative offices. The design 
and implementation of air pollution policies are managed by the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection, while climate change policies 
are managed by the NDRC. Strong cross-departmental coordination 
is key to avoiding repetitive investments and the double counting of 
achievements.
5. Method and data
We calculated the production-based CO2 emissions of China’s 
Table 1





Raw coal CO2 emissions from final 
energy consumption + CO2 
emissions from energy con-
sumption of “thermal power” 
and “heating supply”
CO2 emissions from final consumption + inputs of all possible transformations
Coal-related fossil fuels (such as cleaned coal, coke) N/A
Crude oil CO2 emissions from final consumption + inputs of all possible transformations
Oil-related fossil fuels (such as gasoline and kerosene) N/A
Natural gas CO2 emissions from final consumption + inputs of all possible transformations
Gas-related fossil fuels (such as liquid natural gas) N/A
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